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In 1990, the EMDI Project in Indonesia asked me to conduct a study that would help the 
Ministry of Environment build a case for protecting one of the largest tracts of mangrove in the 
world. Bintuni Bay was located in the most remote part of this vast country, but was the site 
of a shrimp export industry and the subject of intense pulpwood logging. Earlier work by 
conservation groups had identified the 300,000 hectare Bintuni Bay mangrove as biologically 
diverse, and of key local importance to indigenous people. Traditional economic interests 
seemed in complete conflict with environmental interests. Continued exploitation of the 
mangrove for pulpwood logging would undermine the ecological integrity of the mangrove 
ecosystem. Outright conservation would undermine a major export industry and possibly 
threaten the livelihoods of local people who depended on the resource base. Some balance 
between these different interests needed to be struck. 
The basic objective of the study was to conduct an environmental economic analysis of the 
various activities taking place in the Bintuni Bay area. The Ministry of Environment was, at 
that time, starting to close down non-sustainable logging operations while also promoting the 
conservation of important natural areas. The analysis would provide insights into optimal 
conservation and development strategies for the resource. Such an analysis needed to be 
provided quickly to senior policy makers. The entire project - from inception, to field work, to 
analysis, to input into the decision-making process via a workshop of senior policy-makers - 
took less than one-half of one year to complete. Timely delivery of an understandable analytical 
product was therefore an important aspect of the study. 
But an equally important objective of the work was the development of local expertise to 
conduct and participate in such analyses. The acronym `EMDI' stands for Environmental 
Management Development in Indonesia, and all programs under the Project explicitly required 
that development of local expertise be placed as a high priority. This participatory approach 
often prolonged all programs under EMDI, but - as the Project now enters its final (and more 
modestly funded) phase - the project legacy is that a decade of supportive effort has 
contributed to a sustainable environmental management institution in the country. The process 
of local education and empowerment was thus also an underlying thrust of all of the work tasks 
in the Bintuni Bay study. 
Most of the publications relating to the Bintuni Bay study have to date focused on the analytical 
framework, the analytical results, or the policy prescriptions arising from the work (e.g., 
Ruitenbeek 1992, 1994). The purpose of this paper, however, is to discuss some of the 
practical aspects of conducting the research. The `practical aspects' in this case included such 
realities as a $50,000 research budget, a 6-month work timeframe, field work in a militarily 
restricted part of Indonesia, selection of counterparts for a field trip exactly coincident with the 
holy month of Ramadan, stolen field equipment during a 3-day layover for aircraft repairs, 
sharing a research vessel with an illegally trapped crocodile, retirement of two field crew due to 
malaria, as well as countless other research realities that never find their way into the sanitized 
annals of scientific journals. 
This paper is therefore targeted to other researchers with the hope that some of the practical 
lessons learned from the Bintuni Bay study will be useful to them. First, the paper commences 
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with a brief review of the Bintuni Bay area and highlights some of the central results that came 
out of the analysis. Second, it discusses the key methodological issues associated with 
selecting and implementing a research strategy; these methodological issues generally address 
problems such as valuation technique, data availability and study objective. Third, it outlines 
what are - in my view - some myths about the three major logistical challenges in any such 
research program: local empowerment; money management; and, health and safety. Finally, it 
provides some specific examples from the preparation phase, the field work phase, and the 
analysis phase on how the various methodological and research issues were addressed in the 
study. A concluding section includes a retrospective look at the overall study, highlighting 
those aspects that I believe would be relevant to other researchers. 
Bintuni Bay - A First Glimpse 
Bintuni Bay is one of the largest mangrove ecosystems in the world, covering approximately 
300,000 hectares of area on land and another 60,000 hectares to the 10 meter water depth. 
Located on the Bird's Head Peninsula of Irian Jaya, its coastal areas support approximately 
3000 households (Map 1). The area is surrounded by rainforest-covered mountains and has no 
roads leading to it. Access is via a one day sea voyage from Sorong or by intermittent aircraft 
service to landing strips in the villages of Babo and Bintuni. 
A cost benefit analysis was conducted in early 1991 to identify and value the major uses of the 
ecosystem and to identify an optimal management strategy. At the time, illegal cutting of 
mangrove was being undertaken by some of the forest concession holders, and the analysis 
thus focused on commercial mangrove harvesting as a key activity that potentially affected both 
onshore and offshore resources. The analysis concluded that traditional non-commercial uses 
of mangroves had an estimated value of US$10 million/year, commercial fisheries were valued 
at US$35 million/year, and selective commercial mangrove cutting schemes had a maximum 
value of US$20 million/year. Perhaps the most significant `surprise' from the analysis was the 
importance of the traditional resource harvesting activities. 
The analysis also investigated a number of forest management options, ranging from clear 
cutting to a complete cutting ban. These were evaluated in a framework that incorporated 
linkages among mangrove conversion, offshore fishery productivity, traditional uses, and 
benefits of erosion control and biodiversity maintenance functions. "Linkage scenarios" were 
developed that reflected potential ecosystem component interactions in Bintuni Bay. The 
analysis demonstrated that clear cutting is optimal only if linkages are ignored, and that a 
cutting ban is optimal if linear and immediate linkages between ecosystem components exist. 
Under a scenario with linear but delayed linkages of 5 years, selective cutting of 25% of the 
harvestable mangrove was identified as the optimal strategy; it had a present value US$35 
million greater than the clear cutting option, and more extensive cutting beyond the 25% level 
would yield no additional net benefits. The study therefore concluded that strong economic 
arguments exist for conservative mangrove clearing. Where strong ecological linkages occur, 
severe restrictions on clearing activities would be economically optimal. Where ecosystem 
dynamics are uncertain, programs reducing linkage effects - such as greenbelts, replanting, or 
selective cutting - would minimize the potential economic losses. 
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In drawing these conclusions, however, the study relied on information gathered from 
numerous sources - including both household surveys and `official' company and government 
statistics - and used a `linkage' specification that had no precedent. It is therefore quite fair to 
ask questions such as: How reliable are the data? What analytical short-cuts were taken? Why 
were some analytical methods rejected over others? To understand the answers to these 
questions, and ultimately to understand the limitations of the analysis, it is important to reflect 
on the particular methodological and logistical challenges inherent in this work. 
The Research Challenge - Key Methodological Issues and 
Approach 
The methodological issues generally revolve around the problem of selecting an evaluation 
technique that is consistent with the available data, yet will meet the study objectives within 
time and budget constraints. In conducting this study, I would like to draw attention to four 
specific methodological issues that often come up in such circumstances: (i) research 
`approach'; (ii) valuation methodology; (iii) method of data collection; and, (iv) treatment of 
ecological variables and linkages. 
Research Approach: RRA or PRA? 
There is a growing theoretical literature about the various uses and abuses of rapid rural 
appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural appraisal (PRA). Excellent surveys and summaries of 
these approaches are provided by Chambers (1994a,b,c) and Mascarenhas et al. (1991). 
Simply stated, RRA typically concentrates on conventional hypothesis-testing through well- 
structured questionnaires conducted by outsiders, with a view to generating specific products 
that assist in identifying interventions or projects. By contrast, PRA involves a process by 
which locally affected people set the research questions and contribute to the methods of 
information gathering and analysis; a key underlying objective of PRA is local empowerment 
and awareness-building. Both techniques have merit, and the use of one approach or the other 
(or some combination) depends largely on the objective of the research. 
RRA techniques generally are faster than PRA processes, are capable of generating more 
detailed and consistent data sets that are comparable across regions, and will generate well- 
defined products for policy-maker consideration. But RRA techniques are also likely to be less 
innovative, to overlook or understate important local issues, or to generate feelings that affected 
people are being disenfranchised of their decision-making authority. Selection of the 
appropriate technique will therefore depend, largely, on whether the research is 'product- 
driven' or 'process -driven'. 
In the case of the Bintuni Bay study, both the product and the process were important outputs. 
A central research question - "what is the optimal amount of mangrove cut?" - was posed that 
had very specific information requirements, and required answering within a limited time 
period. This called for a strong `product' orientation. But, as noted earlier, local empowerment 
and participation has been a central philosophy of all activities undertaken by the EMDI 
program. Methods and approaches in the Bintuni Bay study therefore attempted to strike a 
balance between these requirements; mostly, however, the approach can be described as a 
hybrid that involves modified RRA techniques executed by locally trained researchers. In 
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practical terms, this translated to turning over as much as possible to local control and authority 
without jeopardizing the general goal of adequately answering the central research question. 
Selection of a Valuation Methodology 
The major thrust of the final `product' was to answer the central research question relating to 
the optimal level of mangrove cut. But the complete study (Ruitenbeek, 1992) also provided a 
vast amount of information and analysis of socio-economic trends and conditions. These dealt, 
for example, with income distribution, access to environmental resources by various income 
groups, the share of rent retained in the region, the role of women in cash and non-cash 
economies, and the impacts of local production patterns on children's education. While the 
following discussion focuses on the valuation methodology, it is important to note that such 
incidental analyses can often be conducted without significant additional effort. 
The first question asks "what resources or uses are likely to require valuation?" While this 
seems an almost trivial point, I have seen many exercises that failed to ask this question. Such 
exercises eventually became `methodology driven'; by preselecting the method that was used, 
they often result in failure because the method is inappropriately applied. As a starting point 
for Bintuni Bay, a checklist approach was used that listed all of the potential ecological 
functions of the mangrove. The checklist used was loosely based on de Groot (1987); 
essentially, this checklist provides some 37 potential carrier functions, production functions, 
regulation functions, and information functions for ecosystems.' Based on such a process, 
Figure 1 shows 8 functions and uses that were eventually targeted for analysis. Because 
previous studies had largely ignored non-traded uses, an emphasis was placed on these with a 
view to comparing them to the conventional traded uses such as woodchip production and 
commercial fishery. 
Given these uses and functions, the second issue must address the technique used for 
valuation. In effect, these approaches are either some form of direct valuation (such as 
production value approaches) or indirect valuation (such as contingent valuation or travel cost 
methods). The indirect approaches are relevant to problems associated with public goods, non- 
traded amenities, or private goods for which no surrogate market is readily identified. In the 
case of the Bintuni Bay functions and uses, most of the uses and functions could be estimated 
using direct techniques of lost production values. The one exception to this was `capturable 
biodiversity value', which was estimated using a rough proxy of international willingness-to- 
pay for large tracts of undisturbed biodiverse ecosystems. A quick estimate of this capturable 
biodiversity early in the study showed that it was relatively small compared to other uses and 
functions; little additional effort was therefore expended on refining this estimate. 
With the analysis now focused on about 8 different uses using primarily a production value 
approach, the next step involves selecting a practical cost-benefit method that allows modeling 
the various interactions among uses. In this regard, it should be recalled that cost-benefit 
analysis will calculate the net present value (NPV) of some intervention or project. For some 
studies, all that the cost-benefit analysis needs to consider is whether a specific project is worth 
' The earlier work was subsequently refined and published in de Groot (1992). A recent review of de Groot 
(1992) reproduces the 37 item checklist and appears in Ruitenbeek (1995). 
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Figure 1. Key Uses, Functions and Linkages in Bintuni Bay Mangrove 
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doing. In such cases, simple valuations of the benefits streams and costs streams are adequate 
for the entire system. In the case of the Bintuni Bay study, however, a somewhat simplified 
applied approach was taken to accommodate the need for the extensive scenario modeling in 
optimization studies. The technique involves separate estimation of `rents' (benefits less costs) 
for each of the various functions and uses. This is analytically equivalent to a more detailed 
estimate of costs and benefits under every potential scenario - and is therefore scientifically 
defensible - while providing an analytically tractable approach to estimating benefits. In effect, 
the NPV attributable to each component (or function) is estimated separately and interactions 
between these components are subsequently modeled. The additional advantage of this 
approach is that the data gathering techniques for each component (or function) can differ 
markedly, and additional emphasis can be placed on those functions or uses that are of greater 
policy interest. The drawback to this technique is that the analyst must be very careful to 
identify both the costs and benefits associated with any given function; all too often the `cost' 
side of the equation is overlooked and rent values are inadvertently overstated. 
The next step involves selection of a shadow-pricing method. Use of production values 
requires estimation of the shadow prices of both benefits and costs. Many methods are 
available to do this and they usually require adjustments for: indirect taxes; regulated prices of 
domestic goods not traded on the world market (such as electricity or water); transportation 
differentials; and, wage rates. The most frequently used methods for shadow-pricing involve 
using national input-output accounts to generate adjustments to market prices; most of these 
adjustments reflect leakages from indirect taxes or from regulated pricing of goods and 
services. Although these accounts are available for Indonesia, they were inappropriate for 
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Bintuni Bay because they reflected `average' conditions in Indonesia, and the relative 
remoteness of Irian Jaya presented additional transportation and wage market distortions that 
needed to be accommodated. Adjustments for indirect taxes in Irian Jaya were not a major 
concern and, because few of the commodities evaluated relied on government regulated utilities 
(such as power or water), such adjustments were also not a major factor. The shadow pricing 
methods used therefore focused on adjusting local benefits by including a transportation cost 
adjustment, and on adjusting cost streams by shadow pricing local labor based on current 
unemployment rates. Both of these approaches are still rough approximations but they use 
readily available data and fall within the accuracy goals set for this study (discussed below). 
The final, and- perhaps the most crucial, step in methodology selection involves scenario 
specification. In my view, this is one of the most overlooked areas of applied cost benefit 
analysis and of valuation. If done incorrectly, it can undermine all of the other theoretically and 
analytically sound valuation work that is done. Basically, for a cost benefit analysis to be 
analytically sound, it should compare a given project to the most likely outcome in the absence 
of the project. Specifying a `project' is typically quite straightforward; specifying an alternative 
to the project is usually given less attention. A common short-cut approach is to assume that 
`nothing' (or some other extreme such as clear-cutting) will happen in the absence of a project, 
but this assumption is often incorrect. A more careful approach, in which a large amount of 
information regarding development options is available, would involve specifying the 
alternative judgmentally. Where very little is known regarding development alternatives, 
however, a wider range of alternatives must be accepted as potentially viable. The approach 
used in Bintuni Bay therefore involves an optimization strategy that explicitly required defining 
a full range of alternatives; this approach requires more analysis but it is necessary where no a 
priori knowledge exists of the most likely alternative. Prior to starting the study, for example, 
some people believed that an unregulated situation would lead to clearcutting the mangroves on 
a 30 year-rotation and over-fishing the shrimp resource. The study results showed, however, 
that this would not be the most likely outcome. The most likely outcome, in the absence of 
some regulation, would be an even more rapid clear-cut and a modest yet sustainable expansion 
in the fishery output. 
A related component of the `optimization' scenario analysis involves the scope of uses and 
functions over which the optimization process occurs. In principle, complex models that 
concurrently select optimal levels of commercial fishery, traditional fishery, logging, and so 
on, can be specified. This complexity was beyond the policy needs of this particular study. 
Policy makers were foremost concerned with the optimal use of forest uses, and were 
interested in how different use of the mangrove forest might effect other components of the 
ecosystem. The simplified study therefore focused on forestry as the optimized function. 
To summarize, the basic methodological approach selected for Bintuni Bay involves an 
optimization style cost benefit analysis that focuses on the impacts of different mangrove 
forestry options on the production value of the entire ecosystem. Values for the entire system 
focused on disaggregating the rents to 8 different components, where rents were estimated 
based on market prices of costs and benefits adjusted for the opportunity cost of labor and for 
transportation differentials arising from the remote location of Bintuni Bay. 
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Method of Data Collection 
When working in developing countries, people frequently complain about the lack of data or of 
its poor quality. Also, data availability problems (and the consequent lack of studies) are the 
most often cited excuse for lack of action among decision-makers; this is true in developing and 
developed countries. It seems to be particularly true of ecological problems, where the entire 
systems are often poorly understood and scientists are reluctant to draw conclusions without 
thoroughly analyzing the problem. I am personally convinced, however, that - because of 
system complexity - no amount of data will ever be enough to provide unequivocal answers, 
and that both decision-makers and researchers must come to grips with the reality of decision- 
making and analysis under conditions of extreme uncertainty. This viewpoint is reflected in 
my general approach to data collection for all studies, and explicitly requires me to `draw a line' 
for the quality of data that I collect and ultimately use in the analyses. 
To start, I would like to outline a few concepts that I find helpful as a backdrop to any 
discussion of data collection. These are: (i) precision versus accuracy, and, (ii) confidence 
class estimates. 
My dictionary defines `precision' as `being sharply or clearly determined' while it defines 
`accuracy' as `being correct'. When conducting any piece of work, I feel that we should be 
more interested in accuracy than in precision. Unfortunately, many analysts masquerade 
inaccurate work by providing apparently very precise numbers. For example, I have an official 
Canadian government oil price forecast done in 1980 that predicts oil prices in 1995 to be 
US$75.46 per barrel. This figure is very precise, but it turned out to be grossly inaccurate. I 
have another document written at the same time that states that oil prices will likely be about 
$20 per barrel through the 1990s. This statement is not very precise, but it turned out to be 
much more accurate. 
The lesson from this is that `accuracy' is a relative term that requires some subjective judgment 
on the part of the analyst. The question one rightfully asks then is: "Relative to what?" I think 
that the accuracy is relative to: (i) the potential uncertainty in the actual system; (ii) the inherent 
attributes of the chosen modeling framework or methodology; and, (iii) the decision-maker's 
policy needs. With respect to the first two, one should consider the relative inherent uncertainty 
within ecosystem response or the modeling methodology; there is no point in getting very 
accurate data if the system itself or if the modeling framework that describes it can not use the 
data. In the case of Bintuni Bay, ecosystem responses were regarded as highly uncertain and 
the modeling framework itself made a number of simplifying assumptions that limited the 
number of variables under consideration. Finally, the primary use of the analysis would be to 
educate decision-makers and others about the linkages and to plan appropriate interventions. 
Such planning and education tasks generally require less information than do detailed project 
design and implementation tasks. In short, a high degree of data `precision' was not necessary 
in the Bintuni Bay study. 
To operationalize this `accuracy' concept, I use a judgmental confidence class estimate to rank 
my data requirements (Table 1). This is based loosely on cost engineering conventions 
typically used by the private sector in developing and implementing investment proposals. The 
scheme explicitly reflects the idea that higher degrees of accuracy generally have different 
applications, and that higher degrees of accuracy will normally require more time or effort to 
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Table 1. Confidence Class Categories for Different Applications in Data Collection 
Category Application Accuracy* 
Class 7 Education +100%/-50% 
[at 1 s.d.] 
Class 6 Setting 
Priorities 
+100%/-50% 
[at 2 s.d.] 
Class 5 Preliminary 
Evaluation 
±50% 
[at 2 s.d.] 
Class 4 Preliminary 
Design 
±30% 
[at 2 s.d.] 
Class 3 Final 
Design 
±20% 
[at 2 s.d.] 
Class 2 Tender ±10% 
[at 2 s.d.] 
Class 1 Audit ±5% 
[at 3 s.d.] 
Uses 
A rough 'order-of-magnitude' estimate, useful as an indicative 
measure and primarily to be applied for awareness building or to 
establish preliminary priorities. 
For setting priorities and for short-listing potential project 
alternatives. 
Typically the first level of an engineering cost analysis to 
determine whether a project might be worth pursuing in more 
detail. 
For budgeting purposes, allocating funds, and final decision- 
making regarding the desirability of a project. 
Based on detailed site evaluations and surveys and provides an 
adequate basis for identifying specific material flows. 
For detailed accounting, ordering of materials, or specification of 
output shipments. 
Usually an 'after-the-fact' measurement of conditions under 
controlled circumstances, used for compliance monitoring or 
similar audit tasks. 
* s.d.=standard deviation; 1 s.d. : -75% confidence; 2 s.d.: -95% confidence; 3 s.d. : -99% confidence. 
achieve. Many people are surprised to find out that most corporate decision-making is done on 
the basis of Class 5 estimates for both cost and revenue forecasts. Many public policy 
applications require a similar level of accuracy, even though researchers often seem unwilling 
to concede that their findings have such a high degree of uncertainty associated with them. In 
the case of the Bintuni Bay study, which has a high awareness-building element to it, a Class 6 
estimate was judged to be the minimum acceptable information requirement for all of the eight 
uses and functions; the data collected were, however, of about Class 5 quality on average. 
Based on this assessment, a cursory review was conducted of likely data sources. Biophysical 
data for forestry and fisheries were available through government agencies that monitored these 
activities. Most of this was based on compliance monitoring, of industry reported statistics, or 
of actual sales volumes as reported through the customs and excise department of government. 
These data were generally regarded as being of approximately Class 3, 4 or 5 quality. Such a 
level of data quality did not therefore require any special data gathering exercises, given that the 
accuracy was well within that required of the analysis. The exception, however, was for non- 
marketed and traditional uses of the mangrove. No existing information was available that 
would provide any comparable figures of either material or monetary flows. It was thus 
concluded that a detailed survey of the local villages would be necessary to gather such 
information. 
Most of the field work was, therefore, organized around the design and conduct of a household 
survey that would provide an adequate indication of these flows. The design of the survey 
(shown in Annex A) reflects a number of principles in data gathering that are worth 
highlighting. First, the survey provides flexibility in response. Second, it provides opportunity 
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for replication at a later data; household location was carefully noted in a complementary 
mapping exercise. Third, it provides a number of explicit quality control variables that 
subsequently permit analysts to assess the reliability of the data. 
Treatment of Ecological Variables 
As noted above, the most significant uncertainty relates to ecosystem response. In the case of 
Bintuni Bay, no studies had been done of the actual linkages between mangrove area and the 
other system functions. In an optimization study, such linkages would be regarded as critical to 
the overall result. Limited studies had been done elsewhere in Indonesia and in similar tropical 
systems in Australia. These generally demonstrated that there was some linkage between 
ecosystem productivity (such as fishery output) and mangrove cover, but the linkages were not 
well understood. More seriously, quantification of these linkages generally eluded scientists. 
Finding an acceptable means of dealing with this complete lack of information represented a 
significant research challenge. 
Three options were considered. The first option involved conducting ecological studies at 
Bintuni Bay that might allow a better ecological description of the material flows in the system. 
Such a study would have taken a decade to complete and was therefore regarded as unworkable 
from the perspective of this analysis. The second option was to base the analysis on a `best 
guess' of the linkages, and to use that (in terms of a direct link between mangrove area and 
ecosystem productivity) as a basis for all optimization runs. This would be relatively simple, 
but no ecologist was prepared to offer a best guess and, in any event, there was no means of 
checking how accurate the guess might be. 
A third option was therefore chosen that involved extensive computer work but no field work: 
a series of potential `linkage scenarios' were defined in a new parametric formulation that 
reflects both the extent of the linkages and the delays in the linkages. The formulation was 
designed such that the range of scenarios covered spanned all of the likely linkages. A "No 
Linkage" scenario, for example, reflected no interdependency of uses. A "Very Strong" 
scenario, reflected a direct correlation between ecosystem productivity and mangrove area, with 
immediate responses to any impacts. This approach would subsequently permit running 
optimization analyses under the different linkage scenarios; these would point to the robustness 
of optimization results and could, more significantly, be used to analyze the consequences of 
making an incorrect decision on the basis of incorrect ecological assumptions.' 
2 The concluding parts of the study make the following observations: "It must be recognized that there is still 
considerable uncertainty in the dynamics of specific mangrove ecosystems. The previous sections have 
demonstrated that if we know the nature of these interactions, an economically optimal strategy can be selected. 
The analysis also demonstrates that if we do not know the nature of the interactions, an incorrect guess can have 
substantial economic penalties. If for example we assume that there are weak delayed interactions and select an 
80% selective cut on that basis, and if it turns out that the actual interactions are immediate and linear, then the 
economic value of such a decision in the Bintuni Bay case would be about Rp500 billion less than what was 
expected, and Rp160 billion less than the optimal strategy." (Ruitenbeek, 1992; p.39) 
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Summary 
The selection of methodologies requires the researcher to address a number of questions about 
his or her research project: 
In selecting a general approach, how important is the research process relative to 
the research product? 
In selecting an analytical methodology, what specific research hypothesis or 
question is being addressed and what are the priority items that need to be evaluated 
to address this question? 
In collecting data, what level of accuracy does the final decision-making require, 
and how much precision can honestly be presented given the inherent behaviour of 
the system or the inherent limits of the modeling structures being used? 
In closing this part of the discussion, it is also worth noting that there are many other 
interesting analytical methods and techniques that can be brought to bear on this type of 
problem. I have, for example, used - in other circumstances - Monte Carlo style risk analysis, 
qualitative dependent variable analysis, general equilibrium modeling approaches, non-linear 
fuzzy logic approaches, and non-linear dynamic complex system models to describe ecological 
and economic system linkages. Personally, for purely scientific research work, I prefer many 
of these non-linear approaches to those used in the Bintuni Bay study. However, none of these 
approaches are readily transferable to most counterparts or analysts in developing countries and 
I therefore avoid them in any research that has a strong `process' or participatory element. 
The Logistical Challenge - Myths on Empowerment, Money 
and Health 
Even when study methodologies and data collection methods have been chosen, there are still 
numerous logistical obstacles that must be overcome in conducting any particular research 
program. All of these logistical challenges must be met with the same type of rigor that one 
applies to the scientific issues. But there are tradeoffs inherent in the logistical issues as well, 
and I would like to draw attention here to some of the critical issues that are often overlooked. 
In Bintuni Bay, as well as in other projects in which I have been involved, I have found that 
the most sensitive issues involve `myths' about empowerment, money and health. 
The Myth of Empowerment 
"Any form of local empowerment is `good'; the less we do as outsiders and the more we 
permit our counterparts to do, the better." 
This is the first myth of participatory research. There are numerous instances in which 
empowerment can inadvertently backfire, and which the well-informed researcher must try to 
avoid. 
The first is what I call the "Puppet-master Effect". When Europeans first came to Africa, for 
example, they sometimes decided that the safest thing they could do was support whichever 
group was in power at that time. On occasion, such as in Burundi, they ended up supporting a 
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small minority tribe, and inadvertently escalated an ethnic conflict that has lasted centuries. The 
same effect can happen, albeit at a smaller scale, when working on a research project in 
developing countries. Probably the most common fault is to strengthen existing local power 
structures beyond their inherent capacity. This can occur through dealing exclusively through 
single agents (such as the village head) or through interviewing only the household head in a 
household survey (who is often male). To avoid this trap, I have found that a good rule of 
thumb is to try to `disperse the empowerment' as much as possible, by involving more people 
rather than fewer people at every step of the process. 
The second might be termed the "Over-Delegation Effect". This occurs when so much of the 
workload is delegated to others that the senior researcher himself or herself appears to be doing 
none of the work. Resentment among team members can, and does, build up very quickly in 
such instances; work quality suffers and team morale goes down. To avoid this. there are two 
rules that I try to follow: (i) never ask anyone to do anything that you would not do yourself; 
and, (ii) figure out what the least enjoyable task is and do it yourself. 
Third, one should beware of "Contrary Team Members". Everybody makes hiring mistakes. 
Seemingly enthusiastic team members at the outset may turn out to be ineffective or 
uninterested in the project after a short exposure to it. It takes a certain managerial skill to 
recognize these individuals and either help them through their difficulty or, if circumstances 
warrant, release them from their duties so that they do not undermine the project or the process. 
Finally, the most insidious and difficult to detect is the "Languishing Effect". This occurs when 
authority is delegated but nobody in fact exercises it. It may be that people do not want to be 
`empowered', or that they do not know what do with the authority when they have it. In either 
case, nothing happens, the project languishes, morale declines, and the project in the end is 
typically judged a failure. To avoid this, some type of intervention is often required to try to 
maintain some form of momentum, but researchers have different thresholds at which they 
choose to intervene. In the case of the Bintuni Bay study, my threshold was very short as I 
was under a time constraint, but I have known of researchers who have willingly waited for 
years for a simple bureaucratic step (such as a research permit) on the rationale that it 
empowered local people. 
The Myth of Money 
"Successful research is expensive; more money will provide better results." 
Most researchers are under relatively tight budget constraints, hence this refrain is quite 
common. It is also common to blame lack of funds for poor quality of data. But the reality is 
that a properly budgeted research program usually will meet the required data needs. Excessive 
budgetary allocations can backfire for a number of reasons. 
First, extra money removes some of the pressure to define data needs carefully. In my view, 
the discipline necessary to define the data needs properly is an important part of the research 
process as it forces the researcher to identify the most efficient means to meet these needs. In 
the absence of such discipline, too much data can be collected, or the wrong type of data might 
be collected. 
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Second, I have often been in field situations one or two years after others have been in the 
same `market' area. If the first wave of researchers were rich and free-spending, then this can 
`spoil' the market by making all subsequent research programs more expensive, thereby 
constraining the work of others. A considerate researcher should be careful to avoid this. 
Third, there is a tendency to pay everybody and anybody when there is a large amount of 
funding available. This can inadvertently undermine the equally important efforts of 
volunteers, many of whom work through NGOs. Empowerment does not necessarily mean 
having access to money. 
To avoid these traps, try to spend one's research budget as if it were your own money. 
Having said this, I should add that I will usually build contingencies into my research budgets 
which are of the order of 20-30% of the estimated expenses. This contingency covers 
unforeseen circumstances related to emergencies or unanticipated opportunities. If, at the end 
of a project, you have unspent contingency funds, return them to the research pot for the next 
project or use them in some extension of the current project. 
The Myth of Health and Safety 
"Successful field work inevitably requires that risks be taken." 
Life is full of risks, but it is a myth that field work is inevitably riskier or more problematic 
than the daily activities in which we normally engage. Unfortunately, the frequency of 
accidents and misadventure appears high enough to give some credence to this. Most of the 
incidents can, however, be attributed to factors that are entirely within the researcher's control. 
The most common cause of accidents is lack of preparation. As a researcher, you should be 
fully aware of all of the health and safety risks to which your team may be exposed, as well as 
learning in confidence any particular medical problems to which individual team members may 
be prone. Adequate funds need to be made available to equip and, if necessary, train team 
members in appropriate first aid procedures (as well as advanced aid and perhaps survival 
procedures if you will be in a very remote location). In the Bintuni Bay study, each team had 
access to basic emergency equipment at all times, as well as a range of first aid supplies; the 
total cost was approximately $500. Most of it was never used; all of the unused items 
(including others such as compasses, mosquito nets, and rubber boots) were left behind as a 
parting `gift' to various villages when the field work was completed. 
The second cause is carelessness. For some reason, many people who are normally very 
careful feel that they are protected by a guardian angel when they start to travel in the field. A 
leading cause of accidental death in developing countries is traffic accidents: use seatbelts; wear 
bright clothing at night; and, avoid travel at night if possible. For common health hazards, such 
as unclean water, malaria risk, or other diseases, appropriate personal precautions must be 
taken and followed. Two people in the Bintuni Bay study team contracted malaria because of 
failure to take the necessary tablets. 
The third cause is poor judgment. I guarantee that there will, sooner or later, come a time when 
you will be faced with a choice between taking a health or safety risk and sacrificing part or all 
of your research program. Unless you have thought through this situation beforehand, and 
how you might deal with it, there is a great deal of pressure to take a risk. The most poignant 
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example I can think of occurred tragically in 1994 when two World Bank consultants and their 
Bolivian counterparts from the Environmental Agency were lost in the rainforests; they had 
decided to take a chartered plane in less than ideal conditions to fill in some details in their 
information requirements. They have never been found. 
Coming to terms with the possible abandonment of a research program is, in my view, the only 
acceptable way of dealing with health and safety issues. To make it easier on myself, and on 
everybody in a research team, I outline and agree on - with fellow team members - any 
`policies' and contingency actions that may be necessary. For example, I have a personal 
policy that I will under no circumstances travel in single engine air transport (including 
helicopters). This has, at times, meant foregoing spectacular flying trips, abandoning certain 
locations, spending extra time using other transport, or spending more money hiring a dual 
engine aircraft. In the case of the Bintuni Bay study, one of our two aircraft engines failed over 
the Cendrawasih Sea on our way to Bintuni, but we were able to return to base without 
incident. Another policy is that, where conditions dictate, I will line up contingency evacuation 
plans in the event of medical emergencies; these can be very expensive but, again, this is not a 
place to compromise. In Bintuni, the day before setting out into the field, we had contacted and 
had placed on standby three emergency services in the area who could have been contacted by 
radio in the event of emergency; the standby charge was modest and, had an emergency 
occurred, it would have used up all of the `slack' funds in my budget.' 
Study Implementation - Examples from Experience 
To close, I will draw on some specific examples from the actual study process to show how 
the aforementioned methodological and logistical issues were addressed. The study itself 
occurred over approximately six months. The first phase of research preparation took about 
three months; this was followed by about two months of field work and then one month of 
final report-writing and dissemination. 
Step 1 - Research Preparation 
Obtaining necessary permits was a key activity during this phase. Research in many developing 
countries requires some form of local permission. In Indonesia, bona fide research requires a 
Surat Ijen (Research Permit) and, when traveling in militarily controlled areas such as Irian 
Jaya, a Surat Jalan (Travel Permit). Obtaining these documents typically takes one year for a 
research permit and, once that is in place, another three to six months for travel permission. 
The entire responsibility of obtaining these permits (quickly!) was delegated to an Indonesian 
counterpart with whom I worked for the entire study. 
Development of methodology was the second major activity. Preliminary surveys were drafted 
with my counterpart based on surveys I had used elsewhere. I then provided funds to a local 
3 I treat my emergency `slack' funds as the contingency amounts plus any undisbursed funds that would 
normally have been used to finish the project if no emergency had happened. In the case of Bintuni Bay, for 
example, about one-third of the total budget was actually allocated to travel and salaries for data reduction, data 
processing, and analysis after the `isolated' field work component was finished. In the event of an emergency, I 
would simply have abandoned these tasks. 
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NGO that was linked into the Indonesian Environmental Study Center network (PSL) to 
contribute more questions to the survey and to field test the survey. The pilot test consisted of 
about a dozen households and substantial refinements were made to the questionnaire after this 
testing (see Annex). Linking into the PSL network was not an arbitrary decision; they are 
associated with all of the major universities in the country and the Bintuni Bay study was 
therefore able to ride on the coat-tails of an existing Research Permit that was held by one of 
the local universities. The local NGO was paid for time and expenses of all of the members 
involved in the field work, as well as for a few trips to Jakarta to work with the Government 
counterparts. 
The third major activity involved a literature review and identification of potential data sources, 
particularly for forestry and fisheries. Confidential data were obtained from companies 
through interviews, and these were compared to `official' statistics. Although the company and 
official statistics typically differed, they were within an adequate level of agreement to conform 
to the study's accuracy requirements. 
The final activity, which started about a month before the field work, involved logistics relating 
to travel, money and health. We collectively settled on a formal field team of six individuals, 
working as two independent teams of three people each: two were foreign consultants; one was 
my local government counterpart; one was a representative from the local government planning 
office; one was a university researcher and local NGO member; and one was local NGO staff. 
An equipment pack was put together for each field team consisting of items such as notebooks, 
compasses, drawing equipment, sleeping bags, mosquito nets, flashlights, rubber boots and 
waders, and safety equipment. One-way tickets were issued by a local travel agent in Jakarta 
for travel to Manokwari, which is the closest major airport to Bintuni Bay, the capital of 
Manokwari District, and our designated `staging' point for activities. One-way tickets were 
used because I prefer to encourage local businesses in the area where I do my research; all 
other travel was therefore organized and paid through a travel agent in Manokwari. (Travel 
agents are an often neglected resource for research teams but, when given the business, they 
are a valuable asset and can be an important contact point in dealing with emergencies.) 
The field work required payments of approximately $10,000 in cash for airfares, individual per 
diems, group expenses (such as hiring boats), and contingencies. In Indonesian currency at 
that time, it would have filled about 2 small suitcases. To minimize risk of loss of the entire 
amounts, all individual per diems were prepaid to team members, services were prepaid 
wherever possible, and half of the funds were wired to a bank in Manokwari for collection 
upon arrival. 
We left Jakarta, I should note, without our Surat Jalan. 
Step 2 - Field Work 
The two months of field work were themselves divided into a number of sub-tasks. First, a 
one week visit was made with key team members to Sulawesi to visit a number of mangrove 
sites and to get to know each other. This was an opportunity to discuss any final changes to the 
survey methods, as well as to review the general approach to the field work. Second, the entire 
team spent a week in Manokwari to gather `official' data and to conduct training and orientation 
sessions for the local researchers. At that stage, the team split into two: three members covered 
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the north shore of Bintuni Bay from Bintuni on foot, and three members covered the south 
shore from Babo by boat. This comprised the actual field survey work that formed the basis of 
the household valuations. After this field work, the teams regrouped in Manokwari and then 
proceeded to the NGO headquarters in Ambon where most of the data analysis was conducted. 
Setting a sample frame for any research study is an important task. The sample frame 
establishes who will, in fact, be surveyed. In the case of the Bintuni Bay area, there are 3000 
households. We had established a need to cover at least 2% of these to get a minimally 
statistically meaningful sample for the purposes of our analysis. To achieve this, given that 
some households might be rejected, we set a target of 100 households. These 100 households 
were chosen at random. The survey would typically take a maximum of one hour per 
household, and the normal procedure was to allow one team member to conduct the surveys 
with an interpreter while the others worked on reducing the previous days' information or on 
mapping the village. 
This study process reflects a number of principles that I have found useful to repeat in other 
exercises. 
First and foremost, it is helpful to do as much as possible in the field. The survey form was 
designed in a way that summary statistics from every household surveyed could be generated 
every evening in a few hours. Doing this in the field allowed early identification of problems 
and, if necessary, resurvey of certain households to clear up any confusing issues. 
Second, the surveyors kept careful track of quality control variables. The forms have a number 
of areas where `information quality' is assessed at the end of an interview. In the end, some of 
the analysis relied on only about two-thirds of the surveys as one-third were discarded because 
of questionable quality. 
Third, wherever possible, use local measures (such as `headloads') and convert these later to 
other units as necessary. In doing this it is especially important, however, to note the potential 
seasonality of some crops; if valuation information is not collected carefully there is a tendency 
to mis-estimate results for seasonal activities. 
Fourth, rely extensively on local expertise. Although our field teams were three people, each 
team hired at least one local interpreter in each village that was surveyed. The interpreter was 
typically selected after consulting with the local head of the village and the local police (who 
were always the first two contacted). In addition, we carried with us a letter of introduction 
from the local development planning office in Manokwari, who assisted us with compiling the 
official data. 
Finally, money handling during the field work flowed through the local researchers, and at no 
time were respondents paid to participate in the survey. Small gifts were, however, carried that 
conformed to local norms. In most cases this involved packets of cigarettes, sugar or other 
foodstuffs. Any payments for local services (meals, interpreters, lodging) were made by the 
local researchers from the project funds to make it look like the `outsider' was not in charge of 
the money. 
We received our Surat Jalan by messenger on the last day of our field work. Its late arrival 
caused no problems for us, as we had always involved the local authorities in all of our work. 
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Step 3 - Follow-up Analysis and Dissemination 
The most significant point to make about the follow-up analysis was that most of it was done 
before we returned to Jakarta. A room was rented in a local hotel in Ambon, where computers 
were set up and team members were shown how to enter and correct errors from the surveys. 
There were no surprises in the data at that time, because the data had already been tabulated 
manually in the field on a daily basis during the actual survey sessions. When the computer 
entry was completed, simple descriptive characteristics were generated and were summarized 
graphically. 
The remaining more complex impact scenarios were modeled in Jakarta and final results were 
published in the form of an English and Indonesian executive summary. These summaries 
were presented at a workshop of senior decision-makers and others within one month of the 
completion of the field work. The results were also subsequently published in an Indonesian 
journal about a year before the official English version of the study was published by EMDI. 
Step 4 - The Reality Check 
A final exercise that must be done by every researcher is a methodological reality check on the 
results. The intuitive test essentially asks the question: "Knowing what is known now, is the 
methodology that was used indeed appropriate for this type of analysis?" In the case of Bintuni 
Bay, for example, the total annual value of the resource represented about 10% of the value of 
the regional economy. Under such circumstances, the simple shadow pricing rules that were 
used in the study are actually questionable because, recalling cost benefit analysis theory, these 
shadow prices assume that any project intervention is marginal and will not in fact effect prices 
in the local economy. As soon as projects or interventions become relatively `large', different 
(and much more complex) shadow pricing methods are necessary. I judged at the time that the 
10% figure was consistent with annual growth in some parts of the economy, and hence I did 
keep using the simplified shadow pricing assumptions. Had the resource value been much 
larger, however, then I might have reconsidered the methodology. 
Conclusions - A Retrospective 
Research as a Transparent Process 
Experience at Bintuni Bay and elsewhere convinces me that there are generally no `correct' or 
`incorrect' choices when it comes to selecting methodologies or to applying analytical methods. 
Most of these choices should reflect explicit tradeoffs between issues such as: process versus 
product; data quality versus data requirements; or, precision versus accuracy. For the most 
part, the research exercise should itself be a transparent process of decision-making on the part 
of the researcher. I say `for the most part' because human health and safety is one area in 
which I believe no compromises should be made, yet, as noted, I have seen numerous 
occasions where it was blatantly neglected to everyone's peril. 
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More on Health and Safety 
I have often been asked if there are major things that I do differently now than I did at Bintuni 
Bay and earlier research work. To answer that, I need to recount some other experiences I have 
had while working in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia on various projects. 
Over the past five years I have watched, in Southeast Asia, `official' AIDS statistics climb 
faster than any other economic, social or environmental indicator that is reported. In West 
Africa, I have lost track of the number of times that a meeting has been canceled or missed by a 
key policy-maker because he has had to travel to his village to attend the death of a friend or 
relative who has succumbed to AIDS. In Guinea-Bissau, where I assisted drafting an 
environmental action plan, I watched helplessly as AIDS incidence among children at birth is 
on an alarming increase, while the life expectancy for individuals in the country as a whole is in 
fact declining because of AIDS. Last year, while in Uganda, our official Government 
counterpart died from AIDS between our original reconnaissance visit and our intended main 
research work; he was responsible for designing an energy conservation strategy for the 
country. And these are not isolated stories. 
In 1992 I attended a lecture, in Jakarta, sponsored by the World Health Organization and the 
UNDP, where one of the speakers made a plea to all field researchers to "ensure that they do 
not contribute to the rising incidence of AIDS." A list of suggestions were given, many of 
which I have since tried to follow in my field work. Generally, the tactics must involve 
adjustments to individual behaviour as well as adjustments to the overall conduct of the 
research program. 
At an individual level, all team members should be aware of the risks of AIDS in the particular 
area they are working, and they should take appropriate personal precautions. The `leader' of 
any research program should take on the responsibility of ensuring that everybody is, in fact, 
aware of the risks, although he or she obviously can not police everybody's actions 24 hours a 
day. 
Adjustments can and should, however, be made to the overall field work strategy. WHO 
evidence suggests that one of the groups at greatest risk to contracting and spreading AIDS is 
traveling or sojourning men with money. On my current research projects in `high risk' areas, 
the types of `adjustments' I have made have therefore been manifold. First, I no longer 
distribute large sums of discretionary funds to people while they are traveling; payment is either 
made well in advance of the traveling (which gives them an opportunity to leave a substantial 
portion of their per diems or honorariums at home) or after the work is finished. Second, I try 
to organize research work for survey gathering as day trips out of the local researchers' home 
base or, if that is not possible, as a series of short trips. My experience has shown that this 
typically will increase travel time and local costs by 50% to 100%. The first response of 
funding agencies is often to balk but, once the reasons are explained, I have never encountered 
any resistance. Third, where extended field work is necessary, research budgets should 
accommodate extra expenses for the local researchers to return home frequently or to bring the 
families to the research location. 
Finally, all junior support personnel (drivers, interpreters, local guides) that are associated with 
a research project should be afforded due considerations for their health and safety. Oddly, this 
is often one of the most difficult to implement because it is customary in many countries simply 
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to give drivers some money for the night and to let them find their own accommodation. I 
have, on one occasion, put my driver in a five star hotel when I was not satisfied that he would 
find an appropriate refuge. Needless to say, such moves are not always popular with project 
budget officers but they are, in my view, entirely justifiable. In short, this is simply another 
example of the adage "never ask anyone to do anything that you would not do yourself." 
Postscript - Dear Diary ... 
This paper has dwelled on how to avoid or address a number of methodological and logistical 
pitfalls and problems. In closing, however, I believe that all such research should also be fun. 
The field work experience provides ample opportunities for discovering new aspects of our 
environment and how we react and respond to it. During the Bintuni Bay study, and in others 
since then, I have gotten into a habit of keeping a personal journal on the events of the day. I 
will, therefore, leave the last words to an extract from that journal, written while in the Bintuni 
Bay mangrove: 
20-3-91.1700: Run aground on a sandbar trying to enter a narrow river ... will wait for tide to 
lift us. Bintuni Bay is big and beautiful now ... the sun sets quietly as birds and frogs 
harmonize in the background mangrove. 
20-3-91.1830: Tide raises us off sandbar and we slowly make our way via a 3 kilometer 
stretch of 10 meter wide river ... snaking into the mangrove forest dead slow. It's dark ... a 
crescent moon is above us ... truly one of my most spectacular experiences here. We arrive in 
Saengga one hour later amidst lots of excitement, dancing and drumming. 
22-3-91.1430: We are now eight hours out of Saengga and I just now discovered that I have 
been sharing my boat - the Angelus III - with two young buaya, each about 1 meter long, 
crammed into a cage which has been serving as a backrest. I think the species of buaya we 
have here is crocodilus ferocus - or buaya laut as they call it. I learned from our surveys that 
it is a relatively important commodity in the mangroves - it is eaten on rare occasions - but is 
usually sold to seafarers live who trade them around to people who try to breed them for 
skins. There are two particularly big crocodiles behind one of the houses in Bintuni. The 
male - named Herman - is certainly as big as any of the Nile crocodiles I've seen .... 
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ANNEX. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY INSTRUMENT (ENGLISH) 
The English translation of the household survey instrument used for the survey in the Bintuni Bay 
vicinity in March, 1991, follows. The "internal use codes" on the first page of the survey were 
coded as shown in Figure A. 1. 
Figure A.I 
Definition of Survey Internal Use Codes 
A B C D E F G H 
I J K L M N 0 P 
R S T U V W X 
Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF 
AG Al AJ 
Field Variable Description 
A SURVEY Survey number (1-101) 
B HHCODE 4 digit household code (abcd); a=interviewer (1-6); b=village (1-7); cd=map 
C QUALITY Interviewer ranking of respondent quality (1-4) 
D WHO Relationship of household head to person interviewed (1-3) 
E FROM Household head bom locally (1) or moved to village (2) 
F INCOME Respondent's estimate of household income ('000 Rp/year) 
G PROD Share of trade produced (0-100%) 
H BARTER Share of trade bartered (0-100%) 
I POPEQ Household population (adult male consumption equivalence) 
J POPTOT Household population normally present 
K POPM Household male population normally present 
L POPAD Household adult population normally present 
M ADMALE Household adult male population normally present 
N EDHEAD Years of education of household head 
O EDTOT Total years of education by all household members normally present 
P POPABS Household population who migrated away over past 5 years 
Q FARM Calculated annual household income from farming ('000 Rp) 
R STOCK Calculated annual household income from livestock ('000 Rp) 
S HUNT Calculated annual household income from hunting ('000 Rp) 
T FISH Calculated annual household income from fishing ('000 Rp) 
U GATH Calculated annual household income from gathering ('000 Rp) 
V MANUF Calculated annual household income from manufacturing ('000 Rp) 
W WAGE Calculated annual household income from wages ('000 Rp) 









Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
Calculated annual household income from 
miscellaneous sources ('000 Rp) 
chicken ('000 Rp) 
hunting crocodile ('000 Rp) 
fish ('000 Rp) 
shrimp ('000 Rp) 
sago ('000 Rp) 
royalties ('000 Rp) 
hunting deer ('000 Rp) 
AG BABI Calculated annual household income from hunting wild pig ('000 Rp) 
Al SAMEAS Team leader quality control variable (0=okay; 1=warning) 
AJ MIGRATE Years ago household head moved here if FROM=2 
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RESPONDENT NUMBER: 
INTERVIEWER INITIALS: 
BINTUNI BAY, IRIAN JAYA 
1. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
Village: 
Date of Interview: '1991 
Name of Person Interviewed: 
Location on Map: 
Relationship to Household Head: 1. Self (HHHead) 
2. Husband/Wife 
3. Other: 
Name of Household Head (HHHead): 
How long has HHHead been here? 1. Bom in Desa 
2. Moved to Desa from 
years ago. 
Other Comments: 
for office use: 
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II. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
Information about household members Normally Present 
Relation Sex Age School Married? Occupation 













Number of Other Members of Household Normally Absent: 
How many are absent : In School [#]: 
How many moved away in last 5 years to work [#]: (moved to [location]: 
How many are absent for other reasons [#]: (Reason: 1. 
(Reason: 2. 
Surveyor Comments. 
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111, HOUSEHOLD INCOME & ASSETS 
Household Income Estimate: Rp /(year/month/week) 
Number of Planted Farms (#; area): Size: 
Are the planted farms: 1. Owned by the individual household? 
2. Owned by a group of households? # 
3. Borrowed?/Rented? ("rented = menyewa") 
[Surveyor indicate which one] 
How much time does it take to travel to planted farms: hours (one direction) 
Is the household self-sufficient? Yes/No 
How much of what the household uses or eats is: Produced by household: % 
Bartered for with goods: % 
Paid for with money: % 
Surveyor Comments: 
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IV. PLANTED CROPS for office 
use 
What are the three most important crops which you sell?: 
Name Quantity Price Value 
1. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
3. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
Comments (regarding seasonalitvl: 
What are the most important crops which you use yourself?: 
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V. MEAT for office 
use 
What are the most important meats which you sell?: 
Name Quantity Price Value 
Livestock 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
Hunting/Trapping 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. _/ /_ 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
Fishing (includes shrimp & other crustaceans) 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
3. _/ 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
4. _/ /_ 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
What are the most important meats which you use yourself?: 
Name Quantity Name Quantity 
1. 3. _/ 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) 
2. 4. _/ 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) 
How far do you travel to HUNT/TRAP? hours 
How long do you stay away when you HUNT/TRAP? 
- - days 
How many from your household go when you HUNT/T'RAP ? 
How far do you travel to FISH? hours 
How long do you stay away when you FISH? 
- - days 
How many from your household go when you FISH? 
1 7: urveyor Comments: 
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VI. NATURAL PRODUCT GATHERING/MANUFACTURING 
What are the most important products which you gather & sell?: 
[fuelwood, timber, sago, fruits, medicines,...?] 
Name 
1. 
Quantity Price Value 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
3. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
4. 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
What are the most important products which you manufacture & sell?: 
[alcohol, charcoal, cane products, rattan, ...?] 
for office 
use 
Name Quantity Price Value 
1. 
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VII MISCELLANEOUS INCOME for office 
Does your household have income from the following sources or activities?: use 
Source Frequency Amount Value 
Wages or Salaries 
Rp 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. / Rp 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
Gifts from Absent Family 
1. / Rp 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
2. / Rp 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
Gifts from Others (Church, for example) 
Rp 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
Other 
/ Rp 
(week/month/year) (week/month/year) (Rp/year) 
VIII. FINAL QUESTION (TIME PERMITTING)? 




IX FINAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT ASSETS (BY SURVEYOR) 
What are the major assets which the household appears to have inside the household? 
(Radio, watches, ...) 
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